

The Event Calculus on High Frequency Finance

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Ignoring the “Obvious”

- Where can we place a piece without collapsing this pile?
- We should be able to evaluate risks given our physics knowledge
- We ignore the physics in financial markets!



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The Physics in Markets

- We don't know many things in this pile
 - Pieces could be wet
 - Pieces might stick together
- But clearing rules in a market are designed!
- So we must be able to study its physics!



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Event Calculus

- Attempt to define market dynamics formally
 - to avoid ambiguity in verbal descriptions
- Markets can be described by states
- Events change the state of the market
- We want to study consequences of events
 - Maintain *consequential closure* if possible
- We want to know exactly what are included in our analysis

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An Event Calculus

State + Orders → State

- How should a state be modelled?

State = (Bid_Q, Offer_Q)

Bid_Q = ((P₁, V₁), (P₂, V₂), ..., (P_{bq}, V_{bq}))

- Where P₁ > P₂ > ... P_{bq}

Offer_Q = ((P₁, V₁), (P₂, V₂), ..., (P_{oq}, V_{oq}))

- Where P₁ < P₂ < ... P_{oq}

i.e. Order book + New orders → New State

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How Orders Are Processed

- We assume that orders are in a queue
- One order is processed at a time
 - Orders = (Order₁, Order₂, ..., Order_n)
 - State + (Order₁, Order₂, ..., Order_n) →
(State + Order₁) + (Order₂, ..., Order_n)
 - Order = (Order_Type, Price, Volume)
 - Order_Type = bid | offer

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Clearing of a sell order

- Let
 - Bid_Q1 = ((P1, V1), (P2, V2), ...)
 - Offer_Q1 = ((P3, V3), (P4, V4), ...)
 - Order1 = (sell, P, V)
- If $P1 < P$ then (Bid_Q1, Offer_Q1) + (sell, P, V) → (Bid_Q1, Offer_Q1 ⊕ (sell, P, V))
- If $P1 ≥ P$ then (Bid_Q1, Offer_Q1) + (sell, P, V) → (((P1, V1 - min(V1, V)), (P2, V2), ...), Offer_Q1) + (sell, P, V - min(V1, V))
- Here ⊕ is the queue joining operator which simply puts the orders in ascending order

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Example snapshot of the market

| | Price | Volume |
|---------|-------|--------|
| offer 5 | 1.65 | 1,000 |
| offer 4 | 1.64 | 2,000 |
| offer 3 | 1.63 | 1,500 |
| offer 2 | 1.62 | 2,000 |
| offer 1 | 1.61 | 3,000 |
| bid 1 | 1.60 | 2,500 |
| bid 2 | 1.59 | 2,000 |
| bid 3 | 1.58 | 2,500 |
| bid 4 | 1.57 | 1,500 |
| bid 5 | 1.56 | 4,000 |

- What is the consequence of a market order to sell 5,000 units?
 - 2,500 sold at 1.60
 - 2,000 sold at 1.59
 - 500 sold at 1.58
 - Price dropped by 1.25%*

* Assume that last transaction price was 1.60 8

Trader positions matter

| | Position | Price | Volume | Margin | Triggered below |
|----------|----------|-------|--------|--------|-----------------|
| Trader 1 | long | 1.65 | 4,000 | 4.00% | 1.584 |
| Trader 2 | long | 1.64 | 2,000 | 4.00% | 1.574 |
| Trader 3 | long | 1.64 | 2,000 | 5.00% | 1.558 |

- Snapshot of trader positions
- Trader 1 will have to sell should price drop below 1.584, for example
- Different traders have different margins

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Effect of Margin Call

Market after clearing sell order of 5,000

| | Price | Volume |
|---------|-------|--------|
| offer 5 | 1.65 | 1,000 |
| offer 4 | 1.64 | 2,000 |
| offer 3 | 1.63 | 1,500 |
| offer 2 | 1.62 | 2,000 |
| offer 1 | 1.61 | 3,000 |
| bid 1 | 1.58 | 2,000 |
| bid 2 | 1.57 | 1,500 |
| bid 3 | 1.56 | 4,000 |

- Price at 1.58
- Trader 1's margin exceeded
- Trader 1 has to sell its 4,000 units now*
- This will push the price down to 1.56
- From 1.60, price dropped by 2.5%

* Assume market mechanism with complete automation 10

Cascaded Effects

| | Price | Volume |
|---------|-------|--------|
| offer 5 | 1.65 | 1,000 |
| offer 4 | 1.64 | 2,000 |
| offer 3 | 1.63 | 1,500 |
| offer 2 | 1.62 | 2,000 |
| offer 1 | 1.61 | 3,000 |
| bid 1 | 1.56 | 3,500 |

- Price at 1.56
- Trader 2's margins exceeded now
- Trader 2 has to sell its 2,000 units (at 1.56)
- Lesson:
 - Price drop depends on trader positions
- What happens if there are no buyers left?

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Revised Model

State + Orders → State

- A state is described by the order book plus the trader positions
 - State = (Bid_Q, Offer_Q, Trader_positions)
- If we know the order book plus the trader positions, we can work out the consequential closure
- See Demo

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Consequences of margin calls

- A trader is in long position because he/she thinks that price will go **up**
- Margin calls cause selling, which help to push the price **down**
 - Exactly the opposite of what he/she expects!
- Cascaded margin calls could lead to substantial falls in price

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Remarks

- We are not trying to predict
 - We are just studying the consequences of events under our calculus
- Consequences of an order is non-trivial!
- Given a snapshot of the market, including the trader positions, we can ask:
 - ? How big an order would cause the price to go down (up) by, say, 2.5%?
- Useful for assessing Value-at-risk
- Related work: [Liquidity Risk](#)

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Future Work

- Real markets are far more complex
- What about market making?
 - How should the market maker [review its prices](#) in response to a big purchase?
- We can define new events
 - [Directional changes](#)
- Wiki-style repository of programs
 - To enable [global collaborative research in finance](#)

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Conclusions

- Top-down classical economics challenged
- Use of physical time questionable
- Intrinsic time is more meaningful
- An **event calculus** helps to identify relevant components and study the physics of markets
 - Cascading effects can be analysed
 - New perspective to Value-at-risk

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